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Abstract
Published reports of microsatellite weapons testing have led to a concern that
some of these “parasitic” satellites could be deployed against US satellites to ren-
dezvous, dock and then disrupt, degrade, disable, or destroy the system. Since the
United States is the most space-dependent country on earth, it has the most to lose
from this type of attack. Current detection techniques including the use of ground-
based detection by optical trackers, radar sensors and satellite telemetry monitoring
were found to be inadequate. Therefore, an effective detection method is required.
Both impact sensing and dynamic sensing solutions were investigated. Dy-
namic detection, the most effective solution, was further explored to include the
creation of a detection algorithm. The algorithm consists of a dynamic detection
maneuver and satellite model which is tuned in order to match the model response
to the physical system response. The detection maneuver is performed regularly
and matched to the model by minimizing a least-squares type cost function over the
model’s moment of inertia.
The algorithm was constructed and validated on AFIT’s ground-based satel-
lite simulator, SIMSAT. Results indicate that microsatellites rigidly connected to a
satellite can be detected with a series of small identical maneuvers utilizing data
available from a typical attitude determination and control system. Variations on
the technique were investigated using the same SIMSAT data. All algorithm vari-
ations readily detected parasite-induced moment of inertia changes of 3–23%. The
most accurate detection scheme estimated the moment of inertia to 0.67%. These
results were applied to operational systems to gain insight into the performance that
may be achievable on-orbit. The results look promising for potential microsatellite
threats to US systems. The detection scheme presented could easily be integrated
into a complete space situational awareness system.
xvi
EXPERIMENTAL DEMONSTRATION OF AN ALGORITHM TO
DETECT THE PRESENCE OF A PARASITIC SATELLITE
I. Introduction
Advances in the miniaturization of space systems technology have, and will continue
to, lead to reductions in space vehicle size and cost. These reductions are leading to
a world-wide explosion in microsatellite usage. One particularly promising area of
research is the use of microsatellites (microsats) as inspection and servicing vehicles
for larger satellites. However, this same technology can be used to rendezvous and
dock with a satellite and disrupt, degrade, disable, or destroy it. Since the United
States (US) is the most space-dependent country on earth, it has the most to lose
from these types of attacks [43].
Ground-based detection of such threats are insufficient. A 1999, government-
sponsored report by the Schafer Corporation [32] concluded that the US Space Object
Identification (SOI) capability in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) is inadequate. Worden
[44] explains: “These sensors are mostly 1960s and 1970s era radar and optical
tracking sensors” and the US “cannot detect and track microsatellite-sized objects in
Geosynchronous Orbit (GEO).” The US Fiscal Year 2000-01 Department of Defense
(DoD) Space Technology Guide [26] cites the need for on-orbit diagnostics aboard
all satellites. It states that “assets must be capable of surveying their own space
environment, both for self-protection against natural and man-made threats and to
determine if they are under attack.” This concept is referred to as Space Situational
Awareness (SSA).
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Figure 1.1 Size Comparison SNAP-1 [31], GPS-IIR [19], and HST [19]
1.1 Current Microsat/Nanosat Rendezvous and Docking Capability
Microsats and Nanosats are defined as satellites with masses less than 100 kg
and 10 kg respectively. Miniaturization enables increasingly complex mission to be
performed by these increasingly smaller/lighter vehicles. Figure 1.1 compares the
size of the 6.5 kg SNAP-1 nanosat to the size of an 1100 kg Global Positioning
System (GPS) satellite and 11,000 kg Hubble Space Telescope (HST) satellite.
Microsat projects are characterized by rapid development scales of six to thirty-
six months. Cutting-edge or Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) technology is rou-
tinely employed in order to provide innovative solutions and cheaper alternatives to
the established methods and systems [31]. Cheaper space operations through the use
of microsats have attracted many countries. Wilson [43] elaborates on the worldwide
proliferation of microsats:
Surrey Space Technologies, Ltd. (SSTL), in England, is considered to be
the market leader in microsatellite technology. SSTL is a commercial,
majority owned subsidiary of the University of Surrey. SSTL has con-
ducted technology transfer and training programs with a goal of enabling
emerging space nations to master microsatellite technology as a step in
facilitating the development and deployment of an increasingly capable
national space infrastructure. To date SSTL has conducted technology
transfer and training programs with: China (Tsinghua-1), South Korea
(KITSat-1/2), Portugal (PoSat-1), Pakistan (BADR-1), Chile (FASat-
Alfa/Bravo), South Africa (UoSAT-3/4/5), Thailand (TMSAT-1), Sin-
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gapore (Merlion payload), and Malaysia (TiungSAT-1). Recently, SSTL
conducted a satellite inspection mission with the Russians and Chinese
using the 6.5 kg SNAP-1 nanosat. In addition to SSTL, other coun-
tries involved in maturing microsat technology include: Russia, Israel,
Canada, Sweden, and Australia.
Microsat rendezvous and docking is an active research topic. The payoff for
large satellites is enormous. Satellite servicing (refueling, repairing, or upgrading)
promises to extend the life of large, high-priced existing and future satellites. This
potential is driving research at an accelerated rate. In 1996, Rafazzotti [27] presented
a “simulator to support the analysis and development of safe techniques to approach,
circumflight, and inspect non-cooperative spacecraft.” Today, many detailed designs
for such microsats exist. An Air Force Research Lab (AFRL)/Lawrence Livermore
National Lab (LLNL) design [17] and ground testing results [16] are readily available.
This 28 kg AFRL/LLNL microsat servicer test article (XSS-10) was flown in January
2003.
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is in the design
stage of its Autonomous Space Transporter and Robotic Orbiter (ASTRO) demon-
stration program. DARPA created ASTRO as part of a larger Orbital Express suite
which is planned to create a comprehensive on-orbit servicing architecture. ASTRO
is an autonomous microsat servicer for in-situ refueling and modular upgrades to
other spacecraft [42]. It requires only minimal input from ground controllers to do
its job.
Moser et al. [21] describes the commissioning of four studies (sponsored by
AFRL) to explore the feasibility and affordability of producing 100 microsats for
under $100M. Each satellite was to have a wet mass of under 40 kg, be capable of
on-orbit inspection and servicing of a generic customer satellite, and be capable of
600 m/s delta-V. Lifetime requirements were 1-month of operational use, 1-year of
dormant mode, and 1- to 5-years of shelf life. The vehicles were either to be launched
into a 400 by 1000 km storage orbit at 55 degrees inclination awaiting transfer orders,
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launched on demand using a small launch vehicle, or air-deployed. The microsat was
to gather images of the target on its way to rendezvous before docking autonomously.
All four studies produced a convincing design with a technology freeze date of 2003.
The studies cited propulsion as an area where improvement could yield substantial
gains in capability.
Innovative solutions are being developed in the area of micropropulsion re-
search. One example is the work being done by Gulczinski et al. [13] in developing
the Micro-Pulsed Plasma Thruster. It is designed to “provide all stationkeeping and
attitude control” for 25-kg class or smaller satellites. The unoptimized test unit
weighes only 600 grams and provides thrust from 20–80 µN using 2–10 W of power.
With the vast amount of research in this area, it was only a matter of time
before new uses for this technology were explored. Governments are often the first
to exploit new technologies for revolutionary military applications.
1.2 A Threat Exemplified
The Report of the Commission to Assess US National Security Space Manage-
ment and Organization [9]—commonly known as the 2001 Rumsfeld Space Commis-
sion Report states:
Microsatellites can perform satellite inspection, imaging and other
functions and could be adapted as weapons. Placed on an interception
course and programmed to home on a satellite, a microsatellite could
fly alongside a target until commanded to disrupt, disable or destroy
the target. Detection of and defense against such an attack could prove
difficult.
Microsat weapons development programs exist. On 5 January 2001, Tung Yi
of the Hong Kong Sing Tao Jih Pao newspaper [46] quoted Chinese sources who
indicated that the Small Satellite Institute under the Research Institute of Space
Technology of the Chinese Academy of Sciences has secretly completed ground tests
of an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon named “parasitic satellite.” Less than a month
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later, the Hong Kong Ming Pao newspaper [6] reported a similar story. The articles
describe the system as consisting of a carrier satellite, a parasite satellite, a launcher,
and ground station. The weapon is secretly deployed as a covert secondary payload
of the carrier satellite. At some later time, it is released, and homes in on the target
satellite, eventually docking with it. During times of war, the ground station sends
a command to either jam or destroy the host satellite.
The papers claim the “parasitic satellites” are small and light to avoid interfer-
ing with the normal operation of the host satellite “and thus [avoid] being detected
by the enemy [46].” Tung Yi also reports the cost of such a weapon is between one
one-hundredth and one one-thousandth that of an ordinary satellite, making it very
cost-effective.
The newspapers explain the weapon will soon be deployed on an experimental
basis and will enter space testing in the near future. This weapon will provide China
with “asymmetrical combat capability so that it will become capable of completely
paralyzing [an] enemy’s fighting system when necessary by ‘attacking selected vital
point[s]’ in [an] enemy’s key areas [46].”
1.3 Impact of a Satellite Attack
The US relies on satellite systems to provide imagery, communications, timing,
weather, and navigational data. This reliance caused the Rumsfeld Space Commis-
sion Report to conclude “the US is an attractive candidate for a ‘Space Pearl Harbor’
[9].”
Loss of US space systems in a time of crisis could have a crippling effect on the
Nation’s ability to respond. “It could lead to forbearance when action is needed or
to hasty action when more or better information would have given rise to a broader
and more effective set of response options [9].” Wilson [43] outlines the potential
impact as follows:
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Some examples of the potential impact of deception, disruption, de-
nial, degradation, or destruction of specific space systems by foreign of-
fensive counterspace operations include:
• Impairment or elimination of reconnaissance satellites that would
reduce situational awareness and could lead to military surprise, un-
derestimation of enemy strength and capabilities, less effective plan-
ning, and less accurate targeting and battle damage assessments.
• Impairment or elimination of missile launch detection satellites that
would degrade the US’s ability to perform missile launch warning,
missile defense, and would increase the psychological impact of the
adversary’s ballistic missiles.
• Impairment or elimination of satellite communications systems that
would disrupt troop command and control problems at all force
levels.
• Impairment or elimination of navigation satellites that would make
troop movements more difficult, aircraft and ship piloting problem-
atic, and could render many precision-guided weapon systems inef-
fective or useless.
• Impairment or elimination of Earth resource and weather satellites
that would make it more difficult to plan effective military opera-
tions.
Threatening or attacking the space capabilities of the US would have
domestic, economic and political consequences and could provoke inter-
national disputes about the origin and intent of an attack.
There are a number of possible crises or conflicts in which the poten-
tial vulnerability of national security space systems would be especially
worrisome. During these situations, the President, his senior advisors
and military commanders would be dependent on information from US
satellite systems to help manage the crisis, conduct military operations
or bring about a resolution to the conflict. If the performance of US sys-
tems were reduced, the diplomatic and military leverage of the US could
decrease, the position of an adversary could be improved, and the cost
and risks associated with achieving US objectives would increase.
1.4 Current Noncooperative Docking Detection Technology
There are two current methods of detection: ground-based detection and satel-
lite monitoring. Ground-based sensing relies on the use of radar sites and telescopes
to find and track harmful objects. Satellite monitoring is the process of watching
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satellite telemetry (orientation, acceleration data, subsystem status, etc.) for signs
of an attack. Both techniques fall short of a robust capability.
1.4.1 Ground-Based Detection. The US currently tracks over 10,000 known
orbiting space objects using radar and optical trackers—most of these sensors are
1960s and 1970s vintage. The US has only limited capabilities to search for unknown
objects using these sensors. Microsat-sized objects in higher orbits such as GEO are
totally undetectable/untrackable [44].
There is a limited capability to do SOI in LEO. For small satellites (<1 m in
diameter), identification (ID) is limited due to inadequate size and shape information.
Inadequate resolution restricts the ability to do a detailed characterization or resolve
anomalies of these satellites (Table 1.1). Satellite status determination is limited by
radar coverage with no capability for theater coverage [32]. If these systems are to
be used for SSA or SOI, they must be upgraded [44].
Table 1.1 Image Resolution Requirements for Satellite Mission & Payload Assess-
ment [32]
Satellite Size Diameter (m) Resolution Requirement (cm) US Capability
Large >15 >50 current
Medium 15–5 16 current
Small 5–2.5 8 limit
Mini 2.5–0.6 2 beyond
1.4.2 Satellite Monitoring. A docking event can range from a violent
collision to feather-light soft dock. Desrocher et al. [10] comment on the complexity
of docking detection by an operational team:
Satellite platform and payload performance monitoring and course
of action decision-making are complex, multi-variate problems for op-
erators. Many times, when anomalies arise, even the most skilled of
operators typically have neither the tools, the scientific and engineering
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backgrounds, nor the means for efficient, real-time collection of all rel-
evant information to make the proper assessment and take appropriate
action.
1.5 Need for Improved Detection/“Smart” Systems
In 1998, former Commander-in-Chief, US Space Command, General Howell
M. Estes III [30] admitted: “If we have an attack [on a satellite], I have no [way
of knowing], for sure, that it’s been attacked. We have ways of telling something
happened to the satellite, but why did it quit?”
Anomaly detection and accurate diagnosis is the first step toward SSA. Unfor-
tunately, an attack can easily be confused with natural phenomena [9]. For example,
space debris can reasonably explain the result of a docking-type impact. “In order
for the US to react appropriately to an attack on its space systems, it must first
know that it has been attacked and the nature of the attack [43].” This is the rea-
son why the DoD [26] has concluded: “Assets must be capable of surveying their
own space environment, both for self-protection against... man-made threats and to
determine if they are under attack.” It suggests the use of on-orbit diagnostics. A
“smart” system would be able to constantly access its own environment and report
significant findings to operators on the ground.
The DoD’s Rapid Attack ID, Detection and Reporting System (RAIDRS) [36]
is a step in that direction. Desrocher et al. [10] are developing the expert systems
for the RAIDRS program. They are “applying artificial intelligence and automated
data collection to support near real-time anomaly detection, characterization, and
reporting.”
Having identified the problem, this thesis now turns to possible solutions to the
parasite satellite problem. These solutions can take many forms including upgrades
to existing ground-based sensors, additional sensors (cameras, pressure sensors, etc.)
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installed on new satellites, new inspection satellites to check older satellites, and
dynamic detection techniques, one of which is described herein.
1.6 Research Objectives
In this thesis, a simple satellite model is employed to detect the presence of a
“parasitic satellite” docked to the satellite of interest. Detection of both the docking
event itself and post-dock presence are examined. It is anticipated that by matching
the model response to the on-orbit satellite response, changes in a satellite’s Moment
of Inertia (MOI) due to the additional mass of the parasite, can be identified. The
merits and limitations of this method of detection are investigated and presented.
The investigation began by creating a mathematical model (using Simulink r©
included with Matlab r©) of the satellite and matching it to the response of an
actual satellite. This requires characterization of the attitude control system and
modal analysis. Modal analysis (looking at all the frequency dynamics of the satellite
structure) can be used to identify mass and stiffness changes to flexible elements of
the satellite. For the research considered herein, a rigid body analysis will be used.
Changes in the rigid body response can be directly correlated to MOI changes,
and thus ID the parasite. A rigid satellite is chosen to match available experimental
equipment. A detection maneuver was designed and a database of satellite responses
to this maneuver was cataloged. A nominal model is defined to best fit the data.
Docking events are then simulated and compared to space debris collisions of similar
intensity. The detection maneuver is performed post-dock and the response is fit to
the nominal model allowing the change in MOIs to be estimated.
To demonstrate and validate the detection technique, a variety of cases are
tested on the Air Force Institute of Technology’s (AFIT) ground-based satellite sim-
ulator (SIMSAT). The simulator system consists of an air bearing assembly allow-
ing nearly frictionless motion in three restricted rotational degrees-of-freedom, an
untethered small satellite assembly consisting of a 3-axis gyroscope, three reaction
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wheels, an onboard command and control computer, batteries, and wireless, real-time
communications from a ground-station computer. The detectability of the “parasitic
satellite” attached to the satellite simulator will be examined and presented. Once
demonstrated and validated, this detection method could be integrated into a larger
“smart” system for anomaly detection/resolution.
1.7 Thesis Outline
This chapter motivated the problem of on-orbit parasitic microsatellite detec-
tion and introduced the research effort. Chapter II reviews literature relevant to
this research as well as develops the tools necessary for application in subsequent
chapters. Specifically, previous work in on-orbit system ID and MOI estimation are
presented, followed by the derivation of the dynamic equations of motion for a satel-
lite controlled by reaction wheels, struck by space debris, and subject to docking.
Simulations were performed to gain insight into the phenomena and a dynamic de-
tection algorithm was constructed. Chapter III characterizes the hardware used to
validate the algorithm. The test procedure and scope are outlined in Chapter IV.
The test results are then presented followed by the data analysis. Several estimation
schemes were tested and are presented. The best estimation scheme was applied
to models of operational systems to assess the level of performance this type of al-
gorithm may provide. Chapter V provides a summary of the work performed, the
results achieved, recommendations for future study, and conclusions.
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II. Background
2.1 Literature Review
The dynamic detection of satellite property changes is simply an estimation
process. There are numerous estimation methods, many of which are thoroughly
documented. One type of estimation methodology is known as system ID.
2.1.1 System Identification. System ID is the process of creating math-
ematical models of dynamic systems based on observed input/output data. It is
a well documented area of research extending far beyond its applications to space
systems. Research can range from Vidal et al. [37] characterizing an optical pick-up
in a common compact disk player to Huang et al. [15] estimating the orientation and
position of a suspended cylinder at National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Langley Research Center’s magnetic suspension testbed.
For space vehicles, system ID is generally performed as a precursor to con-
troller design. Often new methods are tested theoretically, like in [18], before their
widespread use experimentally and in practice.
On-orbit system ID is an important step towards a high-performance satellite
controller. Haugse et al. [14] examined the dynamic characteristics of an opera-
tional space vehicle in an effort to explore the math model limitations and restricted
data provided by ground tests. It was found that “a well designed ground test
can predict on-orbit frequencies within the ±10% design frequency sensitivity” for
the application used in their research. This result emphasizes the need for on-orbit
characterization of satellite parameters especially when their accurate knowledge is
critical to the implementation of a detection algorithm.
A smaller number of papers, however, have been written with regard to on-orbit
system ID. Adachi et al., in 1999 [1], was frustrated that
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...very few papers have appeared that report on-orbit experimental
results obtained using actual spacecraft. Exceptions are the vibration
test of Hermes [11], the Solar Array Flight Experiment [29], the Middeck
Active Control Experiment by the Space Shuttle [12], and the Hubble
Space Telescope pointing-control study [5].
Other examples include Manning and Casteel’s [20] on-orbit work on the Advanced
Controls Technology Experiment (ACTEX), Stetson’s on-orbit ID work on NOAA-2
[33], and Wertz and Lee’s operational MOI estimation of the Cassini spacecraft.
2.1.2 System Identification Methods. Various on-orbit system ID methods
have been investigated. Most, like [3], focus on system ID for the sole purpose of
spacecraft attitude control (including flexible shape control). Some of these methods
and findings are presented below.
Adachi et al. [1] compared two different ID methods on Engineering Test
Satellite-VI (ETS-VI). The Prediction Error Method (PEM) is based on the polyno-
mial black-box model while the State-Space Subspace System ID (4SID) is based on
state-space models. Frequency and time domains were used for comparison. Both
PEM and 4SID were found to create an accurate mathematical model of the satellite,
but the 4SID method was shown to be more promising for large space structures like
ETS-VI.
Whorton and Calise [40] used data from the closed-loop response to random
noise input and a simultaneous, iterative, system ID, and controller design process
to get a high fidelity open-loop plant model. By tackling the controller design and
system ID together, the authors obtained a model which minimizes the difference
between the modeled and actual responses. This method was subsequently validated
with ground test data.
Yamaguchi et al. [45] also used closed-loop data, but from an impulse response
on ETS-VI. The Eigensystem Realization Algorithm (ERA) was used to extract
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a closed-loop plant model and algebraic manipulation used to reach an open-loop
model with good results.
Haugse et al. [14] used on-board excitation to compare the Fast Fourier Trans-
form (FFT), Power Spectral Density (PSD), and ERA methods. It was found that
the FFT method was preferable in detecting modes, while the PSD method may be
preferable in the determination of damping. ERA was found to do a good job of
finding both after a suitable data set was identified by one of the other methods.
Since most system ID experiments are aimed at producing an improved satellite
controller design, the properties of mass and MOIs are usually treated as known
quantities and parameters such as damping ratio and resonant frequencies are to be
found. If the attachment of a “parasitic satellite” is to be found, the reverse is more
useful.
Wertz and Lee [39] estimate the inertia tensor of the Cassini spacecraft based
on conservation of angular momentum. Telemetry data of the reaction wheel spin
rates, spacecraft angular velocities, and ground-based mass properties measurements
of the reaction wheel flywheels were used to calculate the moments and products of
inertia with good agreement with the values estimated from ground-based tests.
Clemen [7] mentions the estimation of a satellite MOI as a sidebar to estimating
other satellite parameters, mainly thruster performance. Various estimators were
examined including linear, non-linear, Extended Kalman, and a search scheme based
on minimizing the difference between measured and modeled data, the results of
which were characterized as “exemplary.” A similar estimation scheme has been
employed in this thesis.
2.2 The Satellite Model
The heart of the proposed detection algorithm is the satellite model. Without
it, anomalies might be detected, but they can not be resolved. The following satellite
model can be used as a building block for more complex systems.
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Some parts of the satellite model are loosely based on the original design of
SIMSAT [8]. For this thesis, the model has been extensively modified to accom-
modate new hardware, software, and research intent. It is comprised of a position
command input that feeds into the controller subsystem. The controller calculates
the wheel commands based on the target orientation and the current orientation.
This causes a change in reaction wheel velocities resulting in satellite motion. The
motion is sensed in the body frame of reference and changed into an inertial frame, by
kinematic equations, completing the loop. Figure 2.1 is a functional representation
of the model.
Figure 2.1 Satellite Functional Diagram
2.2.1 Rotational Dynamics. The way in which applied torques/moments
affect the satellite’s motion is known as the rotation dynamics of the system. Only
rigid body motion is considered here since the validation hardware was built as a
rigid structure. All reasonable attempts were made to create a mathematical model
which accurately matched the physical system.
Figure 2.2 defines the body axes, bi’s, where i is the axis number. Orbital
motion is assumed to be in the b1 direction.
Starting from Newton’s Second Law and following Wie [41], Stevens and Lewis
[34], and Nelson [24],
M =
{
dH
dt
}
I
(2.1)
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Figure 2.2 Satellite Body Axes
where M is the moment exerted on the satellite, H is the angular momentum of the
satellite itself and {·}I notates that the derivative is taken with respect to an inertial
frame of reference. Use the identity:
{
dA
dt
}
I
=
{
dA
dt
}
B
+ ΩB/I × A (2.2)
where A is a generic vector, {·}B denotes the body frame of reference, and Ω
B/I is the
angular velocity vector between the reference frames. Equation 2.1 then becomes:
M =
{
dH
dt
}
B
+ Ω × H (2.3)
where Ω is the satellite angular velocity vector with respect to the inertial frame of
reference.
The satellite’s angular momentum is defined as
H =
∫
satellite
ρ × ρ̇ dm (2.4)
where ρ is the vector distance from an infinitesimal element of satellite mass to the
satellite center of mass and dm is an infinitesimal element of mass. The dot notation
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signifies a time derivative. Using the vector identity of Equation 2.2 a second time:
ρ̇ ≡
{
dρ
dt
}
I
=
{
dρ
dt
}
B
+ Ω × ρ (2.5)
Note that {dρ/dt}B = 0 for a rigid body. Equation 2.4 then becomes:
H =
∫
ρ × (Ω × ρ) dm (2.6)
Resolving Ω and ρ into the body frame yields:
Ω = Ω1b̂1 + Ω2b̂2 + Ω3b̂3 (2.7)
and
ρ = ρ1b̂1 + ρ2b̂2 + ρ3b̂3 (2.8)
Use the vector triple product formula on Equation 2.6 to give:
H =
∫





Ω1
Ω2
Ω3





(ρ21 + ρ
2
2 + ρ
2
3) −





ρ1
ρ2
ρ3





(Ω1ρ1 + Ω2ρ2 + Ω3ρ3) dm





b1
b2
b3





(2.9)
Rearranging produces:
H =





Ω1
∫
(ρ22 + ρ
2
3) dm− Ω2
∫
ρ1ρ2 dm− Ω3
∫
ρ1ρ3 dm
Ω2
∫
(ρ21 + ρ
2
3) dm− Ω3
∫
ρ2ρ3 dm− Ω1
∫
ρ2ρ1 dm
Ω3
∫
(ρ21 + ρ
2
2) dm− Ω1
∫
ρ3ρ1 dm− Ω2
∫
ρ3ρ2 dm










b1
b2
b3





(2.10)
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If the following integrals are defined,
I11 =
∫
(ρ22 + ρ
2
3) dm I12 = I21 = −
∫
ρ1ρ2 dm
I22 =
∫
(ρ21 + ρ
2
3) dm I13 = I31 = −
∫
ρ1ρ3 dm (2.11)
I33 =
∫
(ρ21 + ρ
2
2) dm I23 = I23 = −
∫
ρ2ρ3 dm
Assuming all future vector components resolved in the body axes, equation 2.10
becomes:
H =





I11 I12 I13
I21 I22 I23
I31 I32 I33










Ω1
Ω2
Ω3





≡ IΩ (2.12)
where I is the satellite inertia matrix. Substituting Equation 2.12 into Equation 2.3
establishes Euler’s rigid body rotational equation of motion:
M = IΩ̇ + Ω × (IΩ) (2.13)
If the body axes are chosen to be the principle axes,
I =





I11 0 0
0 I22 0
0 0 I33





(2.14)
and if the applied moment is resolved into the body frame,
M = M1b̂1 +M2b̂2 +M3b̂3 (2.15)
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then Equation 2.13 becomes the following three scalar equations:
M1 = I11Ω̇1 + (I33 − I22)Ω2Ω3 (2.16a)
M2 = I22Ω̇2 + (I11 − I33)Ω3Ω1 (2.16b)
M3 = I33Ω̇3 + (I22 − I11)Ω1Ω2 (2.16c)
Assume reaction wheels are used for pointing control and are now included
in the model. Also assume that the three identically-constructed reaction wheels
are aligned with the body axes. Applying Euler’s rigid body rotational equation of
motion (Equations 2.13) to the reaction wheels produces:
Mib̂i = Irw(ω̇i − Ω̇i)b̂i + (ωi − Ωi)b̂i × Irw(ωi − Ωi)b̂i, i = 1, 2, 3 (2.17)
where i is body axis number, Mi is the reaction moment of the wheel on the satellite,
Irw is the scalar reaction wheel MOI about its rotational axis, ωi is the reaction wheel
velocity relative to the body axes and (ωi − Ωi) is the reaction wheel velocity with
respect to the inertial frame. Since Irw is a scalar and the cross-product of any
quantity with itself is zero, the reaction wheel scalar moments become:
Mi = Irw(ω̇i − Ω̇i), i = 1, 2, 3 (2.18)
Solving for the body rates generates the rigid body dynamics of the system:
Ω̇1 = −
ω̇1Irw
I11 + Irw
+
Ω2Ω3(I22 − I33)
I11 + Irw
(2.19a)
Ω̇2 = −
ω̇2Irw
I22 + Irw
+
Ω3Ω1(I33 − I11)
I22 + Irw
(2.19b)
Ω̇3 = −
ω̇3Irw
I33 + Irw
+
Ω1Ω2(I11 − I22)
I33 + Irw
(2.19c)
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These equations relate the motion of the satellite in inertial coordinates to the mass
properties (MOIs) of the satellite system, the reaction wheel angular accelerations,
and the satellite orientation.
2.2.2 Rotational Kinematics. The rotational kinematics of the system
connect the rotational motion sensed by the satellite to the motion sensed by an
stationary (inertial) observer. In order to find and propagate the absolute orientation
of the satellite, the body angular velocities in the dynamics equations must be related
to the inertial orientation and orientation rates. One of several different methods
are commonly used to arrive at this relationship.
Three consecutive single-axis rotations are used in this thesis to describe the
orientation of the satellite relative to an inertial frame. Starting at the inertial frame
(a frame) and following Wie [41] and Stevens and Lewis [34]:
1. Rotate about the a3-axis an angle ψ
2. Rotate about the new a′2-axis an angle θ
3. Rotate about the new a′′1-axis an angle φ
where ψ is the yaw angle, θ is the pitch angle, and φ is the roll angle. Figure 2.3
illustrates the three single-axis rotations.
Figure 2.3 Kinematic Single-Axis Rotations
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From Figure 2.3 define:









a′1
a′2
a′3









= C3(ψ)









a1
a2
a3









(2.20a)









a′′1
a′′2
a′′3









= C2(θ)









a′1
a′2
a′3









(2.20b)









b1
b2
b3









= C1(φ)









a′′1
a′′2
a′′3









(2.20c)
where:
C3(ψ) =





cos(ψ) sin(ψ) 0
− sin(ψ) cos(ψ) 0
0 0 1





(2.21a)
C2(θ) =





cos(θ) 0 − sin(θ)
0 1 0
sin(θ) 0 cos(θ)





(2.21b)
C1(φ) =





1 0 0
0 cos(φ) sin(φ)
0 − sin(φ) cos(φ)





(2.21c)
Combine Equations 2.21a–c with Equations 2.20a–c to get:









b1
b2
b3









= C1(φ)C2(θ)C3(ψ)









a1
a2
a3









(2.22)
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or explicitly,









b1
b2
b3









=





cθcψ cθsψ −sθ
−cφsψ + sφsθcψ cφcψ + sφsθsψ sφcθ
sφsψ + cφsθcψ −sφcψ + cφsθsψ cφcθ














a1
a2
a3









(2.23)
where the abbreviated forms: cα = cos(α) and sα = sin(α) are used.
The Euler rates are the time derivatives of the Euler angles. From Figure 2.3,
Ω = φ̇b̂1 + θ̇â
′′
2
+ ψ̇â′
3
(2.24)
which can be written:
Ω =
{
b1 b2 b3
}





φ̇
0
0





+
{
a′′1 a
′′
2 a
′′
3
}





0
θ̇
0





+
{
a′1 a
′
2 a
′
3
}





0
0
ψ̇





(2.25)
Substitute
Ω =
{
b1 b2 b3
}





Ω1
Ω2
Ω3





(2.26)
and
{
a′′1 a
′′
2 a
′′
3
}
=
{
b1 b2 b3
}
C1(φ) (2.27)
{
a′1 a
′
2 a
′
3
}
=
{
b1 b2 b3
}
C1(φ)C2(θ) (2.28)
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into Equation 2.25 to get:





Ω1
Ω2
Ω3





=





φ̇
0
0





+ C1(φ)





0
θ̇
0





+ C1(φ)C2(θ)





0
0
ψ̇





=





1 0 −sθ
0 cφ sφcθ
0 −sφ cφcθ










φ̇
θ̇
ψ̇





(2.29)
Invert Equation 2.29 to get the Euler rates:





φ̇
θ̇
ψ̇





=
1
cθ





cθ sφsθ cφsθ
0 cφcθ −sφcθ
0 sφ cφ










Ω1
Ω2
Ω3





(2.30)
The singularity at θ = 90◦ is not an issue due to the small size of the maneuvers
used in this research for this technique. Also, the experimental equipment is not
capable of this attitude.
2.2.3 Satellite Controller. Most satellites spend their entire operational
life under feedback control in order to maintain their desired orientation. A de-
tection technique that uses this closed-loop control is desirable from an operational
viewpoint, but complicates the analysis. If open-loop tests were feasible, a simple
calculation, such as the one in Section 3.4.1, used as the truth model, could be em-
ployed. However, a closed-loop detection scheme has the opportunity to collect data
from every routine motion of the satellite, thereby being transparent to the user.
This type of technique measures the closed-loop response and separates the satellite
characteristics from the controller-induced motion.
In this effort, a Proportional Plus Derivative (PD) controller was used for
satellite pointing control. This type of controller is similar to controllers found on
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some operational satellites. The HST was deployed with a Proportional Plus Integral
Plus Derivative (PID) controller [2]. The addition of the integral term allows control
of constant applied torques. These are generally second order effects, not present in
the hardware simulator and therefore integral control was not included in this effort.
A PD controller responds to the magnitude and rate of change of the error. In
general, PD control is mathematically defined in the frequency (Laplace) domain as:
U(s) = KP +KDs (2.31)
where KP is the proportional gain constant, KD is the derivative gain constant, and
s is the Laplace variable. In the time domain:
u(t) = KP e(t) +KPTD
de(t)
dt
(2.32)
where TD is the derivative time constant, and e is the control error. Figure 2.4 is a
functional representation of the PD controller implemented.
Figure 2.4 Satellite Proportional Plus Derivative Controller
2.2.4 Reaction Wheel System. The reaction wheel motor systems incorpo-
rate closed-loop control with a dedicated motor controller. This PID controller with
velocity and acceleration feed-forward control action is combined with the motor,
amplifier, and encoder in a single unit. Due to the proprietary nature of the motor
used (Animatics Corporation), an exact model is unavailable. It is assumed the con-
troller is a standard design as shown in Figure 2.5. Without a definite model of the
motor control system, it was decided to model the motor empirically using a look-up
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table (See Section 3.4.2). This was necessary for the success of this effort because
the response of the motor directly affects the response of the satellite to commands
or disturbances such as debris collisions or docking.
Figure 2.5 Proportional Plus Integral Plus Derivative with Velocity Feed-Forward
and Acceleration Feed-Forward Motor Controller
2.3 Docking Event Detection
Detection of a docking event can be difficult given that the detectable result of
slowly connecting two spacecraft is very similar to the result of a routine collision with
a micrometeoroid or piece of space debris traveling at high velocity. To gain insight
into this similarity, consider the following derivation and subsequent simulations.
The space debris impact is modeled as an impulsive angular acceleration. The
disturbance acceleration can be calculated from the conservation of angular momen-
tum since the angular momentum immediately before and after the collision event
must match:
n
∑
i=1
Hi
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
Pre−Collision
=
n
∑
i=1
Hi
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
Post−Collision
(2.33)
where i is the number of the element under consideration and n is the total number
of elements. Specifically,
[
Hs/c + Hdebris
]
Pre−Collision
=
[
Hs/c + Hdebris
]
Post−Collision
(2.34)
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where Hs/c is the angular momentum of the spacecraft system and Hdebris is the
angular momentum of the space debris. If the satellite starts at rest (Hs/c = 0),
and the debris is destroyed/embedded after collision in a perfectly inelastic collision
(Hdebris = 0):
r × p = IΩ (2.35)
where r is the position vector from the spacecraft center of mass to the point of
impact and p is the linear momentum of the debris. Resolving r and p into the
body frame produces:
r =





r1
r2
r3





(2.36)
and
p = mparticle





v1
v2
v3





(2.37)
where mparticle is the debris mass. Solving for Ω produces:
Ω1 = mparticle
r2v3 − r3v2
I11
(2.38a)
Ω2 = mparticle
r3v1 − r1v3
I22
(2.38b)
Ω3 = mparticle
r1v2 − r2v1
I33
(2.38c)
To be conservative and present the most detectable case, the maximum single-axis
collision is considered (all relative velocity in one body axis). Without loss of gener-
ality:
Ω2 = mparticle
r3v1
I22
(2.39)
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Integrating discretely yields:
Ω̇2 = mparticle
r3v1
I22 tstep
(2.40)
where tstep is the simulation timestep. Similarly for a docking event:
Ω̇2 = mparasite
r3v1
Inew|22 tstep
(2.41)
where mparasite is the parasite mass and Inew is the new combined satellite and
microsatellite MOI.
The fundamental difference between a debris collision and docking event is
what happens after the acceleration is imparted to the satellite. In a collision, the
satellite MOI remains unchanged (the mass of the particle is negligible) while after
the docking event the satellite MOI is increased by some ∆MOI.
Obviously, it is most stealthy for a parasite to be light (minimize mparasite) and
dock slowly (minimize v), closest to the center of mass of the target (minimize r).
Additionally, to minimize post-dock roll, the relative velocity vector must align with
the center of mass. For a microsat approaching very slowly from the rear (motion in
the b1 direction), this condition is closely met, leaving relative velocity control and
mating location as the important control variables. Figure 2.6 depicts how a satellite
might be targeted based on its center of mass.
Figure 2.6 Satellite Targeted Based on Center of Mass Location
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Microsats generally have very small impulse bits available, allowing for very fine
control of closing velocity (as discussed previously in Section 1.1 on micropropulsion).
With a good relative position measurement, this could lead to very soft attachment.
For manned docking maneuvers, Brody [4] utilizes 0.15 m/s as the critical speed
between failure and success. Takezawa et al. [35] plan to use 0.01 m/s for the
low-impact docking of a 5 kg nanosat.
To gain insight into collision versus docking differences, a simulation was per-
formed. The results are shown in Figures 2.7–2.9. Figure 2.7 illustrates a low-fidelity
docking by a relatively large parasite compared to a debris collision of the same mag-
nitude. The impact speed is 1 m/s, 2.5 m off-target, and increases the target’s MOI
by approximately 23%. Figure 2.8 is a moderate-fidelity docking and Figure 2.9 is
a higher-fidelity docking with an impact speed of 0.01 m/s, 0.1 m off-target, adding
only 3.4% to the target’s MOI.
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
x 10
−3 Collision vs Dock: +23.02% MOI, 1 m/s vdock 2.5 m r⊥ v
P
os
iti
on
 (
de
g)
Collision
Docking
0
1.8
3.6
5.4
7.2
9
P
os
iti
on
 (
ar
cs
ec
)
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
−2
−1
0
1
2
x 10
−4
Time (s)
P
os
iti
on
 D
iff
er
en
ce
 (
de
g)
−1.08
−0.72
−0.36
0
0.36
0.72
1.08
P
os
iti
on
 D
iff
er
en
ce
 (
ar
cs
ec
)
Figure 2.7 Comparison of a Low-Fidelity Docking Versus a Debris Collision of
Equal Magnitude
It becomes apparent that even operators of high tech imaging satellites with
strict pointing requirements and sensitive gyroscopes will have trouble differentiating
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Figure 2.8 Comparison of a Moderate-Fidelity Docking Versus a Debris Collision
of Equal Magnitude
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Figure 2.9 Comparison of a High-Fidelity Docking Versus a Debris Collision of
Equal Magnitude
2-18
differences on the order of 1·10−5 arcsec from noise. The detection is actually even
more formidable than these results suggests. If by chance, or by skill, the microsat
docks so that its velocity vector nearly intersects the target’s center of mass, the re-
sulting response could be orders of magnitude less than presented above. This type
of connection would have no other effect than a undetectable rotation and an un-
detectable in-track change of velocity—one of the most difficult orbit determination
parameters to estimate.
Furthermore, if equipped with reaction wheels, solar panels, and a strong at-
tachment mechanism, it is conceivable that additional stealth could be attained
through the use of the microsat’s own attitude control system. Walker [38] has done
research in this area with the intent of righting and continuing to provide attitude
control for a distressed satellite. A parasite might be able to routinely generate
enough torque to null its own effect on the host satellite.
2.4 Dynamic Detection
As opposed to detecting a single event (docking), dynamic detection senses
changes in the response of the satellite to a known input. By creating a model
that accurately represents the nominal reactions of the spacecraft, alterations to
the spacecraft configuration can be sensed. An angular step command sequence
was chosen as the detection maneuver due to its familiarity, repeatability, and cost-
effectiveness (no fuel expended). A one degree magnitude step was arbitrarily picked
as a starting point. This was determined to be large enough for detection purposes,
but small enough to minimize pointing errors, fuel, and time spent in the maneuver.
Since validation hardware was available for testing this technique, a software
simulation was unnecessary. The experimental process, however, follows.
Nominally, the detection maneuver is performed multiple times on the physical
system, recording the subsequent response. The model is then altered to match this
response. Tunable parameters such as look-up tables, delays, structural stiffness,
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etc. can be changed to get a best fit. Factors such as mass and MOIs (which are
known) are held constant. To find the best fit, a minimization of a least squares-type
cost function was employed:
J =
n
∑
i=1
∥
∥
∥
∥
yactual|i − ymodel|i
n
∥
∥
∥
∥
(2.42)
where J is the cost function, i is the timestep number, n is number of timesteps,
yactual is the time history of the satellite response, and ymodel is the time history of
the model response. In this case the cost is simply the mean mismatch between the
satellite and modeled responses.
Next, the MOI is changed. The detection maneuver is performed post-dock
and the response is fit to the nominal model response, by once again minimizing
a least squares-type cost function. Now only the MOIs are given the freedom to
change and, thus, be estimated. Functionally:
Min J(∆Iii) i = 1, 2, 3 (2.43)
where i is the axis number. The revised cost function for detection is
J =
n
∑
i=1
∥
∥
∥
∥
ymodel|i − ytest|i
n
∥
∥
∥
∥
(2.44)
where ytest is the time history of the satellite response to be tested.
It became necessary to construct a new minimization routine for this pur-
pose because the cost as a function of MOI has multiple local minima which many
“canned” routines can not handle reliably. The routine employed here simply runs
the model over a wide range of MOIs, finds the minimum cost, and repeats the
process on a smaller range. The number of points tested per range of MOIs is held
constant. The routine stops when the convergence criteria is reached. For all tests
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in this document, the minimization was stopped at a normalized MOI precision of
1·10−6. The minimization code is contained in Appendix C.
2.5 Summary
An overview of the body of research for on-orbit system ID techniques and
on-orbit MOI estimation has been presented. The dynamics and kinematics of a
reaction wheel-oriented satellite were derived. This baseline model was expanded
to include either a collision or a docking event and employed to investigate the
differences between the two. It was determined that for a docking with moderate to
high fidelity, the two events were indistinguishable based on time history data. A
motion-based detection algorithm was developed to sense the change in MOI due to
the additional mass of the microsat. This technique was tested using the hardware
described in Chapter III.
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III. Characterization of Experimental Equipment
SIMSAT was originally developed by AFIT’s 1999 Systems Engineering Team “to
simulate satellite behavior with as much fidelity as possible [8].” Design goals in-
cluded:
• Initial cost under $100K
• One year to initial operating capability
• Support for spin, “dual” spin, 3-axis rigid, and flexible structure experiments
• Ability to host experimental payloads
• Simple operation
The SIMSAT System is made of three main parts: the air bearing assem-
bly which provides near-frictionless rotational motion, the satellite assembly which
provides satellite functionality, and the ground-station computer which provides real-
time command/data transmission. The air bearing and satellite assembly are illus-
trated in Figure 3.1.
An exhaustive description of the original SIMSAT configuration can be found
in [8]. The major upgrades included as part of this effort can be summarized as
follows:
• Integrated New Digital Reaction Wheel Motors
– Rewired Motors for Individual Communications and Modularity
– Wrote Digital Communications Software Package
– Tuned 8-Parameter Motor Controller
– Created an Integrated Initialization Package
• Upgraded Onboard Computer
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Figure 3.1 Satellite Assembly and Air Bearing
– Integrated New Real-Time Processor Board
– Integrated New Multi-Function Central Processing Unit Board
– Integrated New Digital Input/Output Board
– Upgraded Existing Analog to Digital Board
• Modified Onboard Computer Ventilation for “Zero-Moment” Operation
• Replaced Onboard Batteries
• Upgraded Ground-Station Computer
– Upgraded dSPACE r© Software
– Upgraded Matlab r©/Simulink r© Software
– Upgraded Wireless Local Area Network Board
• Rerouted Room Ventilation System for “Zero-Moment” Operation
3.1 Air Bearing Assembly
Flotation is achieved through the use of a Space Electronics, Inc. Model SE9791
Tri-axis Spherical Air Bearing. The assembly consists of a spherical rotor, hollow
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shaft, mounting flanges, pedestal, and air compressor. Figure 3.2 illustrates the
configuration.
Figure 3.2 Space Electronics, Inc. Model SE9791 Tri-axis Spherical Air Bearing
While in operation, compressed air, at approximately 500 kPa, is supplied
through the pedestal into six jets in the air bearing cup. The rotor rides on a cushion
of air less than 12.7 µm thick. If a coordinate system is defined for maximum range
of motion, two body axes are unrestricted and a third restricted to ±25◦ due to
contact of the satellite assembly with the pedestal.
3.2 Satellite Assembly
The satellite assembly consists of the structure, attitude determination sub-
system, attitude control subsystem, command and data handling subsystem, power
subsystem, and other systems.
3.2.1 Structure. The SIMSAT structure consists of a central spherical
rotor connected to a hollow mounting shaft. Each end of the mounting shaft is
connected to a separate box truss creating a “barbell-shaped” structure. The box
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truss is made from aluminum plates and stainless steel mounting rods. The aluminum
plates are 53 cm tall by 35 cm wide and vary from a constant 12.7 mm to 2.38 mm
in thickness. Each plate has four 24.5 mm diameter holes to allow the mounting
rods to pass through. The eight 24.5 mm stainless steel mounting rods are 60 cm in
length. Collars connect the aluminum plates to the stainless steel mounting rods.
3.2.2 Attitude Determination. The Humphrey Model CF-75-0201-1 Axis
Rate Gyroscope was used for attitude determination. It provided angular velocity
and linear acceleration in three axes. Only angular velocity data was used in this
experiment. Table 3.1 provides the manufacturer’s performance data.
Table 3.1 Humphrey Model CF-75-0201-1 Axis Rate Gyroscope Characteristics
Parameter Value
Roll Rate Range ±120 deg/sec
Roll Accuracy (Half Range) 1.2 deg/sec
Roll Accuracy (Full Range) 4.8 deg/sec
Pitch/Yaw Rate Range ±40 deg/sec
Pitch/Yaw Accuracy (Half Range) 0.6 deg/sec
Pitch/Yaw Accuracy (Full Range) 2.4 deg/sec
McMaster-Carr Natural Rubber Plate Form Mounts insulate the gyroscope
from the main SIMSAT structure. Figure 3.3 illustrates the installation.
Figure 3.3 Humphrey CF-75-0201-1 Axis Rate Gyroscope and Mounting
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This gyroscope was best suited for short term, large magnitude maneuvers. An
attempt was made to upgrade this instrument (see Appendix A).
3.2.3 Attitude Control. Three reaction wheels, one per axis, provide atti-
tude control. A perforated Lexan r© box encloses the reaction wheel grouping. The
configuration is illustrated in Figure 3.4.
Figure 3.4 Reaction Wheel Cluster
3.2.3.1 Reaction Wheel Motors. The original SIMSAT configuration
has been upgraded to use Animatics SmartMotorTM Model SM3450 Motor Systems
to drive the flywheels. Each motor system integrates a brushless DC servo motor,
motion controller, encoder and amplifier into a single package. Motor characteristics
are listed in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2 Animatics SmartMotorTM Model SM3450 Motor System Characteristics
Parameter Value
Weight 2.90 kg
Length 155 mm
Width 82.6 mm
Voltage 36 V
Encoder Resolution 4,000 counts/rev
Data Interface RS232
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The motors were tuned for a compromise of performance and repeatability.
See Appendix B for a more detailed account of the tuning process. Table 3.3 lists
the motor controller parameters and settings used during testing.
Table 3.3 Animatics SmartMotorTM Model SM3450 Motor System Integrated
Controller Settings
Parameter Value
Proportional Coefficient 25
Integral Coefficient 0
Integral Limit 0
Derivative Coefficient 3,500
Velocity Feed Forward Coefficient 1,000
Acceleration Feed Forward Coefficient 10,000
Error Limit 32,000
Acceleration 25
3.2.3.2 Reaction Wheel Flywheel. The flywheels were fabricated in-
house. Each 8.625 in diameter wheel is made of a steel rim attached to a thin
aluminum disk. The MOI of the flywheel was calculated to be 1.955 × 10−2 kg·m2.
3.2.4 Command and Data Handling. dSPACE r© Inc. hardware and soft-
ware is used for onboard command, control and telemetry in real-time. A dSPACE r©
AutoBox r© DS400 provides the DC computing power and is configured with the fol-
lowing items:
• DS1005 PPC Processor Board
• DS2003 32-Channel A/D Board
• DS2103 32-Channel D/A Board
• DS4201-S 4-Channel Serial Interface Board
Both the processor board and the serial board have been upgraded from the
original SIMSAT configuration. The DS1005 is a PowerPC r© 750 running at 450 MHz
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with 128 MB SDRAM, while the DS4201-S supports RS232 communication at speeds
up to 115.2 kBaud.
A RadioLAN DockLINKTM Model 408-008 is utilized for real-time wireless
command/data transmission at speeds up to 10 Mbps.
3.2.5 Power. Three Power-Sonic r© Model PS-12180 rechargeable batteries
power SIMSAT. Each 12 V sealed lead-acid battery has a rated capacity of 12 Amp-
Hours when discharged at the one hour rate. The bus wiring makes 12 V, 24 V, and
36 V available for subsystem use. All batteries were replaced prior to testing.
3.2.6 Other Systems. Minor systems are also included in the SIMSAT
design.
• A fine tuning weight and balance system consisting of steel masses attached
to adjustable threaded rods is incorporated into the endplate adjacent to the
reaction wheel assembly.
• A low voltage alarm is included to allow adequate time to safely power down
and immobilize the system (if necessary).
• A 32 channel analog input/output connection board is installed below the
onboard computer for easy reconfiguration and testing.
• A portable hydraulic crane is used to transport the satellite assembly to and
from the air bearing pedestal
• A toggle switch cluster is included on SIMSAT to allow each voltage bus to be
individually controlled
None of these items were upgraded as part of this effort.
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3.3 Ground-Station Computer
All of the hardware and software in the ground-station computer was upgraded
from the original configuration.
3.3.1 Hardware. The ground-station computer has been upgraded from
the original configuration to a Dell r© Dimension r© Model 4500. It is driven by an
Intel r© Pentium r© 4 running at 2.26 GHz with 256 MB DDR SDRAM. The original
wireless network card was replaced at the same time and is now a RadioLAN PCI
CardLINKTM Model RMG-160 with the same throughput of 10 Mbps.
3.3.2 Software. The operating system on the ground-station computer is
Microsoft r© Windows r© 2000. Release 13 of Matlab r© (Version 6.5) and Simulink r©
(Version 5) is used for modeling, programming and control system design. The
following toolboxes are installed: Control System, Signal Processing, Real-Time
Workshop r©, and Stateflow r©. The top level experimental Simulink r© model is dis-
played in Figure 3.5. ControlDesk r© Version 2.2.5 is used as the experiment manager
(see Appendix F). It integrates with Simulink r© and the onboard dSPACE r© hard-
ware to allow real-time control and data acquisition.
Figure 3.5 Experimental Simulink Satellite Model
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3.4 Model Matching
In order to get good agreement between the physical model and the simulation,
model parameters must be tuned. Figure 3.6 illustrates the top level Simulink r©
model used for model tuning. It is functionally identical to Figure 2.1.
Figure 3.6 Simulation Simulink Satellite Model
The axes of the experimental equipment are configured as in Figure 3.7.
Figure 3.7 SIMSAT Body Axes
3.4.1 Moment of Inertia. The SIMSAT MOI was determined experimen-
tally through conservation of angular momentum:
Iii =
Irw|i∆ωi
∆Ωi
(3.1)
3-9
COMMAND 
IN-PORT 
CD— 
Position Command 
c^>->/w7| 
Wlieel ^ ' 
Qain       Used in Motor 
Lool<-Up Table 
Desired Orientation 
Body Rates 
Orientation Rates 
Euler Transformation 
Target Orientation 
Delta Wheel Commands 
IVIeasured Orientation 
Controller Subsystem 
Inertlai Frame Orientation 
Inerllal Frame Orientation Rates 
Delta Wheel Commands! 
Dynamics Model 
TELEMETRY 
OUT-PORTS 
 »rn~\ 
Delta Wheel Commands 
Orientatioii_Angles 
■<S> 
Orientation Rates 
where i is the body axis number. Each principle axis was determined individually
by changing the velocity of the reaction wheel and measuring the resultant satellite
motion. Figure 3.8 depicts a single typical test. The slope of the inclined section is
SIMSATs angular velocity.
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Figure 3.8 Typical SIMSAT MOI Truth Test
Both positive and negative directions were averaged to remove any bias. The
result was a baseline MOI matrix:
I =





3.648 0 0
0 36.78 0
0 0 35.16





kg · m2 (3.2)
3.4.2 Reaction Wheels. An attempt was made to simulate the reaction
wheel motor by using the manufacturer’s performance data with unsatisfactory re-
sults. A simple look-up table was then designed (Figure 3.9), which when combined
with a wheel gain, correlated well with the actual response.
The lookup table was constructed empirically by commanding changes in an-
gular velocity and measuring the resultant angular acceleration. These angular ac-
celerations are the ω̇i’s of Equations 2.19a–c. The motor is tuned to accelerate at a
maximum of 9.92 m/s2.
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Figure 3.9 Reaction Wheel Look-Up Table Profile
The wheel gain was tuned at the system level to get a best fit for the entire
baseline data set. It was the last parameter to be tuned as it was dependent on the
magnitude of the detection maneuver.
3.4.3 System Delay. Overall delay was accounted for in the motor model
subsystem for convenience. The actual delay takes place in both the motor and on-
board computer. Both delay and/or the inclusion of a smoothing (averaging) filter
were investigated. While tuning the motors with step commands, some smoothing
behavior was observed and considered for incorporation into the model. The output
of the smoothing filter was simply the mean of the current input and the last n inputs
where n varied from 0–3. A variety of configurations were tested on the system level.
Table 3.4 shows that one delay step and no smoothing result in the minimum error.
Table 3.4 Normalized Error Results for Various System Level Delays
Delay Steps
Smoothing Steps 0 1 2 3
0 1.284 1.000 1.120 1.656
1 1.103 1.009 1.346 –
2 1.001 1.122 – –
3 1.007 – – –
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3.4.4 Detection Maneuver. The detection maneuver consists of four step
commands as shown in Figure 3.10. It is symmetric to remove any bias in the
response. During the first step, the wheels accelerate in the negative direction, then,
maintain a negative speed, until the second step where they return to near zero and
vice versa for the second portion of the sequence. Since the motor response is slightly
different while speeding up than slowing down (peculiar to SIMSAT’s Animatics
motors, see Appendix B), the maneuver is designed to include both positive and
negative positions. Only the first and third steps are used in the analysis. Figure 3.10
illustrates the 1◦ detection maneuver. The heavy lines indicate the portion of the
command used for matching.
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Figure 3.10 One Degree Detection Maneuver
Implementation of the detection maneuver is described in Section 4.1.
3.5 Summary
This chapter provided an overview of the SIMSAT system that was overhauled
and used as a test bed to determine the effectiveness of the detection algorithm.
Extra steps were taken to characterize system peculiarities necessary for accurate
modeling. It was expected that a better model would leader to better results. The
test results are presented in the next chapter.
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IV. Results and Analysis
This chapter begins with a description of the lab test procedures. Next, baseline data
is presented, followed by various methods of detecting the presence and estimating
the size of parasite-induced changes in MOI.
4.1 Test Procedure
Experimental single-axis testing of the yaw axis was chosen in order to better
isolate the change in behavior, but could easily be expanded to tri-axis testing. The
yaw axis was chosen for the following reasons:
1. It best represents on-orbit motion.
2. The gyroscope sensitivity in the pitch axis was larger than the other two axes,
which magnified the gyroscope drift and noise, making this a poor choice. See
Appendix A.
3. Maneuvers in the roll axis were marred by bending along this axis. Stiffeners
were not yet installed at the time of testing.
Even though these irregularities were minor as compared to gross satellite
motion, they were deemed undesirable when testing a precision pointing response.
Due to the configuration of the lab equipment (See Figure 3.7), a yaw motion in
the lab would be most analogous to a pitch or roll motion of a gravity-gradient
stabilized satellite on-orbit. The findings and techniques used herein however, are
readily adapted to other axes and configurations.
The testing process began with the programming of the ground-station com-
puter to run the detection maneuver. Next, the satellite assembly was floated on
the air pedestal, balanced, powered, and positioned. The same starting orientation
was achieved by sighting along the satellite assembly to a wall target. High precision
4-1
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Figure 4.1 Example Data Set
was unnecessary since the satellite was programmed to hold position for the first
15 seconds of the maneuver and gyroscope drift/noise caused some motion before
the first step command began (this was unavoidable). The ground computer then
started the command sequence and recorded the telemetry. Figure 4.1 is a data set
that illustrates most of the peculiarities of the system.
Data collection started after approximately 2.5 seconds. During this time the
gyroscope drifted (as well as the satellite to a lesser amount) to approximately -0.2◦
with a drift rate of approximately -2.5◦ per minute (in the case shown). This was
a typical drift rate for these tests. At approximately 4.25 seconds, the motors had
been initialized and began operation. This closed the position error and the satellite
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assembly tracked the drift for the remainder of the run. At 15 seconds, the step
maneuvers began. Only the first and third step responses were used in the analysis.
See Section 3.4.4 for more detail on the maneuver. Notice that the overshoot response
on step one was less than that on step three even though these were symmetric
commands. This bias due to gyroscope drift was the reason why both steps one and
three were used (on-orbit, a simple step command could be utilized). Notice also that
the response to steps one and four as well as the response to steps two and three
were quite different even though the same relative maneuver was commanded. It
was found that the motor response while slowing down was somewhat different than
that while speeding up. Refer to Appendix B on motor tuning for further discussion
and results. The satellite controller was tuned for a second-order damping ratio of
approximately 0.7, yielding an overshoot of approximately 4%. These values yielded
a good response that settled quickly.
The gyroscope drift was a minor problem during testing. The drift was random
with long period motion on the order one to two minutes. The mean drift was
a function of operating temperature—the value changed rapidly after power was
applied and slowed to a steady-state mean drift rate after approximately 20–30
minutes. Testing was performed after this steady state was achieved. Constant drift
had little effect on the response since the satellite assembly was brought up to the
constant drift speed during the first few seconds of a run, well before the first step
command was executed.
4.2 Test Scope
The baseline tests included a 1◦ detection maneuver with a nominally con-
figured satellite assembly. Four other 1◦ configurations were tested, each with a
different MOI. Table 4.1 lists the MOI values tested, as well as, the normalized and
Additional Moment of Inertia (+MOI) for each configuration.
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Table 4.1 MOI Values Tested
MOI (kg· m2) Normalized +MOI (%)
35.158 1 –
36.363 1.0342 3.42
37.672 1.0715 7.15
39.215 1.1154 11.54
43.250 1.2302 23.02
Next, the test scope was expanded to investigate the effect of the detection
maneuver magnitude on the sensing ability of the algorithm. The satellite controller
tuning parameters were not changed between detection maneuver magnitudes. The
result was no overshoot for 0.5◦ steps and approximately 20% overshoot for the 2◦
steps. In other words, as the maneuver magnitude increased, the damping decreased.
The test matrix is catalogued in Table 4.2. In all, 165 tests were used in this effort.
Table 4.2 Number of Test Points at Different Detection Maneuver Magnitudes
+MOI (%) 0.5◦ 1◦ 2◦
– 10 25 10
3.42 10 10 10
7.15 10 10 10
11.54 10 10 10
23.02 10 10 10
4.3 Test Results
The reaction wheel motors were modeled empirically due to lack of access to
the built-in motor controller design (See Sections 3.4.2 and 2.2.4). This resulted in
a simple motor model, but also a motor model that needed to be tuned for each
detection maneuver amplitude. Each magnitude family (column of Table 4.2) was,
therefore, tested nominally (zero +MOI) multiple times in order to tune the model
using a least squares type minimization. The minimization routine had to be robust
enough to handle multiple local minima.
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Figure 4.2 Example Data Fit
After the model was tuned, off baseline data was tested. A similar minimization
routine was used to estimate the MOI. Figure 4.2 represents a typical data fit. Recall,
only steps one and three are used for matching. For this example, this equates to
times: t = 10–20 s and t = 30–40 s.
4.3.1 Baseline Results. The baseline MOI values were estimated by first
creating the baseline model. This was done by fitting the model to each individual
baseline data run. The model parameters were then averaged (arithmetic mean) to
arrive at the detection model. Since the model was tuned to this baseline set of
data, the normalized distribution has a mean of 1. Due to the nonlinearity of the
4-5
model, this process was repeated two more times for the other detection maneuver
magnitudes.
Table 4.3 lists the basic statistical analysis of the baseline data for all detection
maneuvers. All data that follows was normalized to the nominal satellite character-
istics unless otherwise noted (i.e. divided by the baseline characteristic). Notice
that the range and standard deviation (SD) of the estimated MOI improve with the
amplitude of the detection sequence. It is believed that the larger overshoot experi-
enced on the 2◦ maneuvers allowed for a better data fit and was responsible for the
reduction in standard deviation.
Table 4.3 Statistical Analysis of Different Baseline Detection Maneuver Magni-
tudes
0.5◦ 1◦ 2◦
Mean 1.00 1.00 1.00
Range 0.127 0.114 0.0827
SD 0.0416 0.0313 0.0246
The baseline data distributions are illustrated in Figure 4.3. Each bar repre-
sents ±0.5% (span of 1%) MOI. Remember that the baseline data for the 1◦ maneuver
contained 25 runs as opposed to 10 runs for the other maneuvers.
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Figure 4.3 Baseline Data Histogram
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4.3.2 Estimated MOI Results. The data in this section was estimated by
fitting the baseline model to each off-baseline data run by only varying the model
MOI. The mean MOI of the 10 trials was estimated to be actual MOI value.
First, a parametric analysis was performed to test the effect of parasite size
on the estimated MOI deviation. The estimated MOI for 0.5◦, 1◦, and 2◦ tests are
compiled into Figures 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 respectively. Each histogram was normalized
to the actual MOI value for ease of comparison (i.e. a value of 1 is zero error).
Again, the same trend of decreased data range for increased maneuver amplitude
was observed.
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Figure 4.4 Estimated MOI Histogram, 0.5◦ Maneuver
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Figure 4.5 Estimated MOI Histogram, 1◦ Maneuver
Figure 4.7 illustrates some statistical data as a function of MOI. Notice that
the seemingly stray data point in Figure 4.6, pane four increases the range and SD of
the 2◦ data at 23% +MOI, but the MOI estimate remains remarkably accurate with
a mean MOI estimation accuracy of 0.67% for non-baseline testing. The 1◦ and 0.5◦
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Figure 4.6 Estimated MOI Histogram, 2◦ Maneuver
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Figure 4.7 Detection Result Statistics
maneuvers only detected to a mean MOI accuracy of 1.2% and 3.5% respectively.
With 10 runs, the 1◦ and 2◦ groups detected all configurations within ±2%. The
mean SD of the 1◦ and 2◦ maneuvers was nearly identical at 3.4% MOI, while the
0.5◦ maneuver was nearly double at 7.7% MOI.
Data overlap between sets and MOI estimation accuracy are the critical factors
to the operator or detection algorithm. Overlap is related to the SD, while accuracy,
in this case, is simply the distance from the mean MOI detected in the data set to
the actual value. Figure 4.8 illustrates how a single reading could not determine
the actual MOI to more than ±15% in some cases. If the 0.5◦ maneuver were used
and detected a normalized value of 1.05, the actual value could be anywhere from
nominal to 11.5% +MOI. Multiple runs had to be performed to “average-out” the
noise in the measurements. The question then became: “How could the method
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Figure 4.8 Data Overlap and Accuracy
be improved to limit the data overlap and improved the accuracy?” The next two
sections look at improving the estimated MOI, from the same data set.
4.3.3 Estimated MOI Results, Method Two. One method of decreasing the
data spread was by rejecting data runs (responses to the detection command) on
the periphery. It was hypothesized that the data runs least corrupted by noise and
other factors, in general, fit the model best. The mean angular mismatch during
the match interval was chosen as the metric and defined as the positive difference
between the actual response and the modeled response averaged (arithmetic mean)
over the matching interval. The model was tuned using only the data runs that were
50 percentile in error. Similarly, the off-baseline data sets were fitted and half of
the data runs with the most mismatch were eliminated (i.e. “statistical outliers”
were ignored). Figure 4.9 shows the statistical trends, while Figure 4.10 shows the
relative relationships between the data sets.
The normalized error for method two was larger than method one by an average
41% margin. Both, the mean range and mean SD were generally reduced using
method two. The range was on average 30% less than the baseline, while the SD
was 11% less. Table 4.4 summarizes the findings.
The decreased range and SD offered by this method is desirable, but the cost
in accuracy associated with this method precludes its use. Perhaps a less drastic
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Figure 4.9 Detection Result Statistics, Method Two
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Figure 4.10 Data Overlap and Accuracy, Method Two
Table 4.4 Estimation Method Comparison, Method Two
Mean Error (×103) Mean Range (×102) Mean SD (×102)
Method 1 Method 2 Method 1 Method 2 Method 1 Method 2
0.5◦ Maneuver 35.18 52.84 23.98 18.78 7.733 7.240
1◦ Maneuver 11.60 14.10 10.94 8.424 3.351 3.412
2◦ Maneuver 6.703 10.30 10.91 6.127 3.358 2.550
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estimation scheme could capture the benefits of this method without the high price
paid in accuracy.
4.3.4 Estimated MOI Results, Method Three. A more moderate estimation
system was implemented, again using the mean mismatch between actual and mod-
eled responses. This method used a weighted average with weights, Wi’s, defined
as:
Wi =
1
Ei
(4.1)
where Ei is the angular mismatch normalized to the minimum angular mismatch
of the set and i is the number of the run within the data set. The runs with the
least mismatch became more important than those with a higher mismatch level.
The weighting process was used both to tune the model and to detect the +MOI.
Figures 4.11 and 4.12 were the result.
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Figure 4.11 Detection Result Statistics, Method Three
Table 4.5 Estimation Method Comparison, Method Three
Mean Error (×103) Mean Range (×10) Mean SD (×102)
Method 1 Method 3 Method 1 Method 3 Method 1 Method 3
0.5◦ Maneuver 35.18 36.53 2.398 2.401 7.733 7.743
1◦ Maneuver 11.60 13.12 1.094 1.091 3.351 3.341
2◦ Maneuver 6.703 7.686 1.091 1.093 3.358 3.362
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Figure 4.12 Data Overlap and Accuracy, Method Three
Method three increased the normalized error over method one in every case by
an average of 10%. The change in range and SD was minimal with average increases
less than 0.2%. Table 4.5 summarizes the results.
4.3.5 Repeatability. It was believed that some of the variability from run
to run, given the same command input, could be traced back to the reaction wheel
motors. A test was performed to test this theory. The motor tuning parameters
were changed from a balance between performance and repeatability to a lower
performance, higher repeatability state by changing the acceleration parameter from
9.92 m/s2 (motor controller tuning parameter, A=25) to 5.16 m/s2 (A=13). The
result confirmed the theory (Table 4.6 and Figure 4.13) that increased repeatability
leads to decreased data spread. The range and SD were reduced by 21% and 13%
respectively. This result allows us to conclude that higher fidelity reaction wheels
(typical space hardware) would result in much less variation in the data yielding
more reliable estimates of the MOI. Fewer maneuvers would be required to get the
same quality estimate or the same number of maneuvers would result in a better
estimate.
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Table 4.6 Results of Repeatability Investigation
Mean Range (×102) Mean SD (×102)
Baseline Performance 8.266 2.462
Low Performance 6.546 2.147
0.85 0.9 0.95 1 1.05 1.1 1.15
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Actual MOI (Normalized)
N
um
be
r 
of
 O
cc
ur
an
ce
s
Baseline, 2 Degree Maneuver
0.85 0.9 0.95 1 1.05 1.1 1.15
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Actual MOI (Normalized)
N
um
be
r 
of
 O
cc
ur
an
ce
s
Reduced Acceleration, 2 Degree Maneuver
Figure 4.13 Repeatability Comparison, 2◦ Maneuver
4.4 Application of Results
Having successfully demonstrated the detection algorithm in the lab, the find-
ings of this thesis, as presented above, were applied to operational systems. The
GPS-IIR satellite and HST were considered.
4.4.1 Method. The analysis begins by defining the change in MOI:
∆I = Inew − I (4.2)
where ∆I is the change in MOI due to the docked microsat (+MOI). Assume the
system center of mass remains unchanged (the mass of the parasite is small relative
to the satellite). For simplicity, adapt Equation 2.11 to a discrete distribution of
mass in a single axis:
∆Iii = ∆m(ρ
2
i+1 + ρ
2
i+2) (4.3)
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where i is the axis number evaluated modulo three and ∆m is the change in system
mass—the change in MOI was caused by a change in mass, m, at a position, ρ.
Solving for ∆m or the mass of the parasite:
mparasite =
∆Iii
ρ2i+1 + ρ
2
i+2
(4.4)
where i is again the axis number evaluated modulo three.
4.4.2 Applied Results. The approximate mass properties of the GPS satel-
lite [23] (aligned with the body axes defined in Figure 2.2) are:
I =





1725 0 0
0 782 0
0 0 2020





kg · m2 (4.5)
Using the best detection algorithm as derived in this paper (Method I, 2◦ maneuver,
0.67% mean accuracy), the detectable MOI limits become:
∆I = I · 0.0067 =





11.56 0 0
0 5.239 0
0 0 13.53





kg · m2 (4.6)
The GPS bus is a 1.6 m cube with its center of mass centrally located. Assume the
parasite is docked on the satellite exterior centered on the b1 axis. To be conservative,
define the parasite center of mass to also be located on the satellite exterior (not
offset some distance). The position of the additional mass relative to the system
center of mass is then:
ρ =





.8
0
0





(4.7)
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Applying Equation 4.4 to find the minimum mass detectable at this location, results
in a minimum detectability of 8.2 kg. This is the worst case scenario for this satellite
configuration. A similar investigation into the HST [25] provides a detectable limit
of 52 kg. Figure 4.14 is a depiction of the HST. As expected, the least detectable
locations are the circle of points on the cylindrical satellite bus passing through the
solar panel attachment points.
Figure 4.14 Hubble Space Telescope
Attack on a GPS satellite would appear to be detectable assuming a parasite
mass on the order of 40 kg. On-orbit results would have to be better than observed
on the ground-based simulator in order to detect HST parasites. This improvement
is expected, but the size of any improvement is unclear. An estimate of the utility
of this method on specific satellites is possible by examining characteristics at the
system level.
4.5 System-Level Characteristics
If second order response characteristics are applied to the satellite at various
MOI configurations, insight into the top-level requirements for this type of detection
algorithm can be determined.
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Figure 4.15 tracks overshoot, rise time, and settling time as a function of MOI
for the 2◦ maneuver. Note that the time characteristics (rise time and settling time)
are quantized to the timestep used in the simulation, 0.05 seconds, yet the trend
is clear. It is shown that overshoot is the most sensitive to these types of changes,
whereas rise time is rather insensitive. Using this chart, one can determine the
repeatability required in order to detect a parasite of a given size. For example, if it
is known that for a series of identical maneuvers the overshoot of particular satellite
varied ±5%, one can expect this method to be able to detect 4.1% changes in MOI.
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Figure 4.15 Second Order Characteristics as a Function of MOI
4.6 Summary
The test procedure and scope were described followed by the baseline test
results. It was discovered that the larger amplitude maneuvers with greater overshoot
led to more repeatable measurements in the baseline data. This in turn led to more
repeatable and accurate results for most test cases. The equally weighted mean of
all the individual measurements was found to best estimate the parasite-induced
+MOI. It was found that repeatable reaction wheel motion is an important factor
in the quality of the estimate achieved. The most accurate method was applied to
operational systems to better understand the utility of the system. The results were
promising. Finally, system-level properties were investigated so that one might be
able to predict how well this system may operate on a specific platform with a given
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repeatability of motion. Chapter V presents the conclusions drawn from this work
and recommendations for the future.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
The US is currently blind to attack by microsats. If this is to change, action must be
taken to increase the situational awareness of satellites. Detection methods, like the
technique outlined in this thesis, can be used immediately to drastically increase the
degree of US readiness. Further research would be beneficial to refine the method
and adapt the system for operational deployment.
5.1 Conclusions
The detectability of “parasitic” satellite attack was investigated. Cited re-
search deemed ground-based methods inadequate using current equipment. It has
been suggested that the impact of a soft-dock would be detectable by operators.
Docking and collision models were constructed to test response differences. Detect-
ing the docking event itself proved to be indistinguishable from routine space debris
collisions. Angular differences from zero to the order of 10−5 arcsec were calculated
for a relatively high fidelity docking maneuver compared to a debris collision of the
same magnitude.
A dynamic detection technique was then devised and validated on a ground-
based satellite simulator. The baseline methodology required the creation of a satel-
lite model and detection maneuver. Next, the satellite’s response to the detection
command was recorded. Model parameters were changed to fit the model response
to the satellite response. By fitting the model to future satellite responses, changes
in MOI could be sensed. This was based on the assumption that the only model
parameter changed to get a best fit during these operational runs was the satellite
MOI.
Parasite-induced MOI changes of 3–23% MOI were investigated. Detection
maneuver amplitudes of 0.5◦, 1◦, and 2◦ were tested on a system optimized for 1◦
motion. The mean of multiple trials were required for positive ID of a parasite and
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estimation of its size. The 2◦ maneuver yielded the best results with a mean SD
of 3.4% MOI and mean error of 0.67% MOI with 10 trials per configuration. Esti-
mated MOI values were normalized to the actual satellite properties. All detection
command sets did successfully sense the additional parasite mass.
Other estimation schemes were explored utilizing the average angular mismatch
between the actual response and the modeled response as a weighting factor between
runs in a set. Culling data based on this metric, generally reduced the range and
SD of data, but did not improve the accuracy overall. Using a weighted average to
come to a final MOI estimate based on this metric was also tested. The weight was
chosen to be the reciprocal of the mean angular mismatch. The results were similar
to the baseline case, but were generally unimproved by any measure.
The results suggest that even smaller changes in MOI can be detected. Detec-
tion of MOI changes on the order of 1% would not be unreasonable on the current
test apparatus. The detectability limitations depend on the number of trials per-
formed and the repeatability of the satellite response. Better results are expected
on-orbit, as the lab results were limited by the fidelity of SIMSAT system. Military
satellites generally employ the use of high-quality space-qualified hardware.
5.2 Recommendations
The work presented in this thesis can be immediately incorporated into a de-
tection package. Follow-on work in this field would ease the transition to operational
detection and expand the applicability of the findings.
5.2.1 Future Work. Additional research in this field will allow an even
higher-quality detection scheme to be easily incorporated into current satellite oper-
ations. Possible areas of further exploration include the following.
• A more robust estimation scheme could be incorporated to decrease compu-
tation time and automate detection. A layered approach might be incorpo-
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rated using a batch filter for estimating MOI from individual maneuvers and
a sequential filter for maneuver-to-maneuver MOI estimation. This task is
nontrivial due to the nonlinearities (saturations, delays, look-up tables) in the
model.
• Combined axis testing could be implemented to reduce the number of motions
required to sense change.
• The same command sequence given multiple times to SIMSAT resulted in
a range of responses. This variation in time histories led to the “spread”
of detected MOI values. Investigation into the non-repeatable nature of the
experiments performed in this thesis could help predict how closely the results
presented here might correspond to on-orbit operation.
• Further investigation and testing of the motors could lead to an improved
model of the motor controller creating a more robust model of SIMSAT.
• The results presented here only considered a rigid body. Many satellites have
appendages (antennas, solar arrays, etc.). Flexible structures could be incor-
porated on SIMSAT to simulate these effects. It is unclear if the modal testing
of such satellites will increase or decrease the detection sensitivity.
• The detection maneuver could be tailored to specific satellite operations and
stationkeeping maneuvers for a transparent deployment of the system.
5.2.2 Current Results. The research provide herein verifies that parasite
satellites can be detected today. Only simple models and readily available data are
required to drastically increase our SSA. Old telemetry data can be used for model
creation and tuning. Current routine maintenance maneuvers may be able to be
used for detection purposes.
The most likely method of installation of this detection algorithm is as part
of a “smart” system where artificial intelligence is used to monitor satellite health
and environment. The “brain” of this kind of system requires tools and rules to
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operate. This detection scheme is readily integrated into a complete SSA system
such as RAIDRS. The deployment of such a system could be designed to have no
impact on current operations, but provide fundamental knowledge of the systems
readiness for war.
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Appendix A. LN-200 Fiber Optic Gyroscope Upgrade
A high-quality gyroscope would greatly increase the usability of the SIMSAT sys-
tem. The current gyroscope needs constant attention to achieve good performance.
The measurements are highly temperature sensitive and noisy. It must be run for
approximately 30 minutes prior to testing to achieve steady-state performance. Even
at this point, short and long period noise are present. The noise in the roll and yaw
axes has an amplitude on the order of 0.1◦ while in pitch this noise is amplified
approximately five-fold. For experiments lasting on the order of minutes, this long
period noise presents problems. Without regular software recalibration, the drift in
the pitch can soon reach extreme levels. It is not uncommon to start the SIMSAT
system at 0◦ in pitch and find that after five minutes of closed-loop operation holding
this “position”, the system is in contact with the pedestal (i.e. >25◦ drift). A better
system is desired.
A Litton r© (now Northrop Grumman r© Navigation Systems) model LN-200
Fiber Optic Gyroscope (FOG) was purchased for this purpose. Figure A.1 illustrates
the LN-200 FOG. It is a space-qualified FOG with up to 1◦/hr accuracy. This is
expected to be a two order of magnitude improvement. It is approximately the same
size as the current gyroscope for simple physical integration. Table A.1 presents the
relevant instrument characteristics.
The data communications integration proved to be difficult. The author spent
considerable time (months) attempting to integrate this hardware into the SIMSAT
system. The fundamental problem is the conversion of the SDLC data stream to an
asynchronous data structure for capture by a standard asynchronous RS-485 port.
The synchronous SDLC data steam uses a flag/framing structure and therefore has
no “start” or “stop” bits allowing the data to remain relatively unaltered within the
frame as opposed to an asynchronous structure where the data is usually chopped
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Figure A.1 LN-200 Fiber Optic Gyroscope
into 8-bit “chunks”. Attempting to receive this synchronous framed data on an
asynchronous platform results in data loss where the “start” and “stop” are stripped.
Additionally, this conversion is required to be accomplished onboard the satel-
lite assembly and must use only direct current (DC). The onboard computer is a
proprietary design and standard computer cards will not interface with it correctly
although company representatives mentioned it may be able to provide DC power to
a non-compatible board. The author unsuccessfully searched for a COTS solution
Table A.1 Northrop Grumman r© LN-200 Characteristics
Parameter Value
Weight 700 g
Diameter 8.9 cm
Height 8.5 cm
Power Consumption 10 W
Bias Repeatability 1–10◦/hr
Random Walk 0.04–0.1◦ hr1/2 power spectral density
Data Latency <1 msec
Data Protocol RS-485
Data Structure Synchronous Data Link Control (SDLC)
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and/or COTS hardware that could be integrated into a workable solution. A custom
piece of hardware is expected to be implemented as funds allow.
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Appendix B. Reaction Wheel Motor Tuning
The motors used in the reaction wheel assembly are not designed for this pur-
pose. They are manufacturing motors most often used for assembly line opera-
tion/automation. Some of the difficulties encountered as a result of this mismatch
follow.
• The motors are optimized for the use of position commands, not velocity com-
mands. Some of the controller parameters do not translate well into velocity
operations, for example the mandatory position error limit.
• The motors are capable of accepting velocity mode commands, but have no
tachometer to measure velocity. A finite difference routine is needed to calcu-
late velocity.
• The large flywheels and lack of friction cause the motors to be regularly oper-
ated outside of the envelope for which they were designed.
• The proprietary nature of the controller restricts access to its design. This
makes designing a program to optimize the tuning parameters very difficult.
The unorthodox use of the motors makes the manufacturer’s tuning documen-
tation/experience of little use.
The author spent two weeks tuning the motors for maximum performance over
a broad range of commands for general SIMSAT usage. Large commands require
large amperage. Even smaller commands have a large transient peak power require-
ment that altered the response between the bench power supply and the onboard
batteries. The largest power supply available to the author, trips its breaker at
approximately 20 Amps, requiring most tests to be done from battery power. Unfor-
tunately, the batteries were deteriorated and only lasted for approximately 10 maxi-
mum performance tests before requiring to be recharged for six to eight hours. New
batteries were ordered, received, and installed to continue testing. In all, over 200
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Figure B.1 Default Tuning Response
tests were performed to find a suitable set of tuning parameters. Figure B.1 shows
the response of the factory-set default tuning values to a 50 rad/s square pulse at an
acceleration of approximately 200 rad/s2 (acceleration parameter of 500). This value
is approximately ten times larger than the maximum found in the test protocol, but
10 times less than the maximum range. Notice the high frequency oscillation due to
poor tuning and the lower frequency limit cycle due to exceeding the maximum po-
sition error value which turns the motor off momentarily only to restart and repeat
the cycle.
Figure B.2 is an intermediate stage of tuning (all values as in the final config-
uration with the exception of KP=15, KD=2500, and A=500), so larger commands
are possible. Notice the excellent acceleration performance to −50 rad/s followed
by a “kink” in the response as the next step begins and again as it crosses from
deceleration to acceleration. During the final change in command, the motor once
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Figure B.2 Intermediate Tuning Response
again enters an error limit-driven limit cycle. This one is less severe and therefore
recoverable.
The final testing configuration was used to make the response in Figure B.3.
Notice the smaller slope (lower performance) accepted in return for a clean repeatable
acceleration. Notice also the drastic difference between acceleration and deceleration.
Fortunately, this distinction is less apparent for the smaller changes in velocity used
by the test protocol, but provided here to clearly illustrate the phenomenon.
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Figure B.3 Final Tuning Response
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Appendix C. Minimization Program Code
The following Matlab r© script file was used to find the best fit between the actual
and modeled data. The program sequence is as follows:
1. Load the data set to be considered (one file at a time)
2. Load the simulation options
3. For each data run
(a) Test 20 MOI points between 50%–200% Baseline MOI
(b) Choose the point with the minimum cost
(c) Cut the MOI range in half centered on the minimum cost
(d) Repeat from (a) until the MOI step is < 1·10−6
4. Plot the resulting data fit
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Program find_I33_best
% Minimizes the mismatch between a Simulink
% Model and actual SIMSAT data
%
% Capt Vincent Dabrowski, 2003
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
global I11 I22 I33 Iw ex ey
format long; clear;clc
%CHOOSE FILESET
disp(’set#1: BL’)
files=[’a32 a34 a35 a36 a37 a38 a39 a40 a41 a43 a44 a45 a46 a48...
a49 a50 a51 a52 a54 a55 a56 a57 a58 a59 a61’];
%disp(’set#2: BL half’)
%files=[’a63 a64 a65 a66 a68 a69 a70 a71 a72 a73’];
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%disp(’set#3: BL two’)
%files=[’a74 a76 a77 a78 a79 a80 a81 a82 a83 a84’];
%disp(’set#4: 10kg, 1 deg’)
%files=[’a86 a87 a88 a89 a90 a91 a93 a95 a96 a97’];
%disp(’set#5: 10kg, .5 deg’)
%files=[’a98 a99 a100 a103 a104 a105 a106 a107 a108 a109’];
%disp(’set#6: 10kg, 2 deg’)
%files=[’a110 a111 a112 a114 a115 a116 a117 a118 a119 a120’];
%disp(’set#7: 4kg, 1 deg’)
%files=[’a122 a124 a125 a126 a127 a128 a129 a130 a132 a133’];
%disp(’set#8: 4kg, .5 deg’)
%files=[’a134 a135 a136 a137 a138 a139 a142 a143 a144 a145’];
%disp(’set#9: 4kg, 2 deg’)
%files=[’a146 a147 a148 a149 a150 a151 a153 a154 a155 a157’];
%disp(’set#10: 2kg, 1 deg’)
%files=[’a158 a159 a161 a162 a163 a164 a166 a167 a168 a169’];
%disp(’set#11: 2kg, .5 deg’)
%files=[’a170 a171 a172 a174 a175 a176 a177 a179 a180 a181’];
%disp(’set#12: 2kg, 2 deg’)
%files=[’a182 a183 a184 a185 a186 a188 a189 a191 a192 a193’];
%disp(’set#13: 1kg, 1 deg’)
%files=[’a194 a195 a196 a197 a198 a200 a202 a203 a204 a205’];
%disp(’set#14: 1kg, .5 deg’)
%files=[’a207 a208 a209 a210 a211 a212 a213 a214 a215 a216’];
%disp(’set#15: 1kg, 2 deg’)
%files=[’a218 a219 a220 a221 a222 a225 a226 a227 a228 a229’];
%disp(’set#16: 0kg, 2 deg, A=13’)
%files=[’a231 a233 a234 a235 a236 a237 a238 a239 a240 a241’];
model=’simsat_sim’
%CHOOSE SIM OPTIONS
command=1 %1 deg
simlength=55
C-2
start_t1=15/.05+1;
stop_t1=25/.05+1;
start_t2=35/.05+1;
stop_t2=45/.05+1;
% command=2 %0.5 deg
% simlength=55
% start_t1=15/.05+1;
% stop_t1=25/.05+1;
% start_t2=35/.05+1;
% stop_t2=45/.05+1;
%command=3 %2 deg
%simlength=75
%start_t1=15/.05+1;
%stop_t1=30/.05+1;
%start_t2=45/.05+1;
%stop_t2=60/.05+1;
%command=4 %2 deg A=13;
%simlength=95
%start_t1=15/.05+1;
%stop_t1=35/.05+1;
%start_t2=55/.05+1;
%stop_t2=75/.05+1;
steps=simlength/.05+1;
num_data_pts=stop_t1-start_t1+stop_t2-start_t2;
% SIMSAT MOIs
%BL set
I11=3.647546812465531e+000;
I22=3.677811796985044e+001;
%I33=3.515802468071735e+001;
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%~10kg
I33=4.324981053845178e+001
%~4kg
%I33=3.921527184484653e+001
%~2kg
%I33=3.767249505661412e+001
%~1kg
%I33=3.636324072038076e+001
% Wheel MOI
Iw=1.955099417802845e-002;
%WHEEL GAIN
WG=0.89569311523437; %Set 1
%WG=1.00108245849609; %Set 2
%WG=0.92266143798828; %Set 3
%Determine # of Files
delimiters=find(files==’ ’);
num_files=length(delimiters)+1;
for ii=1:num_files
[token,rem] = strtok(files);
filename=[token,’.mat’]
load(filename)
files=rem;
start= .50*I33;
finish=2.00*I33;
step=(finish-start)/20;
J_min=1e10;
change=1e10;
while step>1e-6
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for I33=[start:step:finish]
[tout,x,y] = sim(’simsat_sim’,simlength,[],...
[[0:.05:simlength]’,command*ones(steps,1),WG*ones(steps,1)]);
J=sum(abs(data(start_t1:stop_t1,3)-sy(start_t1:stop_t1,1)))+...
sum(abs(data(start_t2:stop_t2,3)-sy(start_t2:stop_t2,1)));
% figure(1)
% plot(I33,J)
% hold on
if J<J_min
J_min=J;
I33_best=I33;
end
end
start=I33_best-2.5*step;
finish=I33_best+2.5*step;
step=(finish-start)/20;
end
error_mean=J_min/num_data_pts
load I33_best
% Save best fit & Mean Error
save_error_mean_1(ii)=error_mean;
save_I33_best_1(ii)=I33_best;
save(’I33_best.mat’,’save*’)
[tout,x,y] = sim(’simsat_sim’,simlength,[],...
[[0:.05:simlength]’,command*ones(steps,1),WG*ones(steps,1)]);
figure(2)
clf
plot(data(:,1),data(:,2),data(:,1),data(:,3),tout,sc(:,1),tout,sy(:,1))
legend(’ec’,’ey’,’sc’,’sy’)
xlabel(’Time (s)’)
ylabel([’Velocity (rad/s), Mean Error: ’,num2str(error_mean,’%6E’),’ rad/s’])
grid
end
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Appendix D. Simulation Model Library
The following figures illustrate the mathematical model of the satellite. Its response
was used as part of the minimization program (Appendix C) to estimate the MOI
of the actual hardware. The programming language is Simulink r©.
Figure D.1 Top Level Simulation Model
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Figure D.4 Wheel Dynamics, Level 3 Submodel
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Appendix E. Experimental Model Library
The following figures illustrate the control logic of the satellite simulator. It was used
to define the command/telemetry structure of the experiment. The programming
language is Simulink r©.
Figure E.1 Top Level Experimental Model
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Figure E.4 Velocity Decoder Cluster, Level 3 Submodel
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Appendix F. Experiment Software User Interface
ControlDesk r© software by dSPACE, Inc. was used as the real-time link between the
experimental hardware (SIMSAT), control software (Simulink r©), and the user. An
interface (Figure F.1) was created to more easily recalibrate the gyroscopes. The
user can immobilize the SIMSAT and “zero out” the gyroscope before the start of
operations. An averaging mechanism is designed into the Simulink r© model to assist
in the calibration process.
Figure F.1 Gyroscope Calibration Interface
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The ground station interface was developed for general SIMSAT usage and is
illustrated in Figure F.2. This interface was reproduced from the original SIMSAT
design effort as a demonstration and diagnostics tool. It includes three different ways
to input position commands and three large buttons to allow the operator to quickly
return the system to the origin. The satellite angular velocity and reaction wheel
speeds are displayed both on dials and numerically. The PD controller settings were
added to the layout and can be adjusted during operations as necessary.
Figure F.2 General Operation Interface
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be deployed against US satellites to rendezvous, dock and then disrupt, degrade, disable, or destroy the system. An
effective detection method is essential. Various sensing solutions were investigated including visual, impact, and dynamic
techniques. Dynamic detection, the most effective solution, was further explored. A detection algorithm was constructed
and validated on the Air Force Institute of Technology’s ground-based satellite simulator, SIMSAT. Results indicate that
microsatellites rigidly connected to a satellite can be detected with a series of small identical maneuvers utilizing data
available today. All algorithm variations readily detected parasite-induced moment of inertia changes of 3–23%. The
most accurate detection scheme estimated the moment of inertia to 0.67%. The results look promising for sensing
potential microsatellite threats to US systems. The detection scheme presented could easily be integrated into a complete
space situational awareness system.
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